UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-16-2019

State v. Hollingsworth Appellant's Brief Dckt. 46156

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Hollingsworth Appellant's Brief Dckt. 46156" (2019). Not Reported. 5218.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/5218

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
1/16/2019 9:31 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent

,

v.
BRET D. HOLLINGSWORTH,
Appellant.

)
)
) Supreme Court No. 46156-2018
)
)
)
)
)

__________________________________________________________________
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
__________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada
__________________________________________________________________

HON. MICHAEL REARDON

JOHN C. LYNN
500 W. Bannock St.
Boise, ID 83702
208.860.5258
john@johnlynnlaw.com
Attorney for Appellant

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
State of Idaho
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
208.334.4534
ecf@ag.iaho.gov
Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

A. NATURE OF THE CASE

1

B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

2

C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

5

ISSUES ON APPEAL

8

ARGUMENT

8

A. INTRODUCTION

8

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

10

C. IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE DISTRICT
COURT TO ACCEPT THE PLEA OF GUILTY

11

1. The District Court Failed to Advise Appellant of the
Elements of the Charge -

11

2. The District Court Failed to Establish a Factual Basis
to Support the Charge -

16

3. The District Court Abused its Discretion with
Respect to Appellant’s Post-Judgement Motions –

21

CONCLUSION

24

i

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)

9

Henderson v. Morgan, 427 U.S. 367, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976)

13

Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 647 P.2d 796 (app 1982)

12, 14. 16, 17

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed. 2d 162(1970)

19

Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60, 625 P.2d 414 (1981)

14

State v. Bradley, 98 Idaho 918, 575 P.2d 1306 (1978)

14

State v. Coffin, 104 Idaho 543, 661 P.2d 328 (19830

18

State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 557 P.2d 626 (19760

10, 14

State v. Hansloven, 147 Idaho 530, 211 P.3d 775(App. 2008)

11

State v. Hoffman, 108 Idaho 720, 701 P.2d 668 (App 1985)

19

State v. Jones, 129 Idaho 471, 926 P.2d 1318 (App. 1996)

10

State v. Marcias, 142 Idaho 509, 129 P.2d 1258 (App 2015)

15

STATUTES:
Idaho Code§§ 18-903(a), 907

11

Idaho Code §18-201(3)

11

Idaho Code§ 19-201

11

Idaho Code § 18-114

12

RULES:
I.C.R. 11(c)

12

I.C.R. 32(h)(5)

2

I.A.R. 31(b)

2
ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal challenges the trial court’s acceptance of a guilty in the face of
protestations that Appellant meant no harm to the alleged victims. The record here
will show that there was a breakdown in the process designed to ensure that a
citizen tendering a plea of guilty to a serious crime is doing so intelligently,
knowingly and voluntarily - that did not happen here. Due to the pressure to
process cases, this problem has arisen before and will occur again. In each case,
the Appellate Court must ultimately confront the question as to whether there is
confidence in that process.
Unfortunately, Appellant’s claims against the process have been bifurcated.
The record here is incomplete, given related post-conviction proceedings still
pending before the District Court. In the event these post-conviction proceedings
provide no relief, Appellant will file an appeal therein and request this Court to
consolidate the appeals if time permits.
As a consequence of timing, Appellant is forced to proceed on a piece-meal
basis, that is, asking this Court to review the guilty plea process without
consideration of trial counsel’s role in that process.

Nevertheless, the record

supports the Appellant’s case on appeal, as limited as it is forced to be.
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
In the underlying criminal case, Ada County Case No. CR FE 20160001499, a JUDGMENT & COMMITMENT was entered on October 5, 2016,
against Appellant following a guilty plea to Aggravated Battery, Idaho Code
§§18-903(a), 907(a), (b) (R. pp 80 – 82). Appellant was represented at that time by
Tiffany Hales, private counsel. Appellant did not file an appeal.

Subsequently,

Appellant retained new counsel and filed a post-conviction relief action, with
supporting declarations, on October 17, 2017, before District Judge Reardon, who
previously accepted the guilty plea (R. pp. 160–248). As a result of the postconviction proceedings, Judge Reardon found counsel Hales deficient in failing to
file an appeal1; the JUDGMENT & COMMITMENT filed on October 5, 2016, was
re-entered on June 7, 20182. Appellant filed a timely appeal (R. pp. 140–147).
Also, Appellant filed a NOTICE OF REQUEST FOR AVAILABILITY OF PSI
TO APPELLATE COURTS pursuant to I.C.R. 32(h)(5) and I.A.R. 31(b) (R. pp.
164–165).
As mentioned above, this appeal arose from the related post-conviction
proceedings cited above.

The PETITION therein asserted numerous grounds

1

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: STATE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, filed in
CV 01-17-19830, on June 7, 2016, p. 13.
2 Id
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meriting relief, including the claim that tracks the issues on appeal here, that is, the
District Court erroneously accepted Appellant’s guilty plea. Equally important,
however, Appellant claimed that his trial counsel, Tiffany Hales, was ineffective in
her representation of Appellant at the trial court level, including the failure to file
an appeal. These post-conviction proceedings are pending before Judge Reardon;
the parties have submitted respective motions for summary judgment and the Court
has not ruled on these motions as of the filing of this Appellant’s Brief. Because
of the pending post-conviction proceedings, Appellant filed a MOTION TO
SUSPEND BRIEFING SCHEDULE pending resolution of the post-conviction
proceedings; this Court denied said Motion by Order dated November 11, 2018,
without explanation.
To restate Appellant’s concern, the issue on this appeal - the District Court’s
acceptance of Appellant’s guilty plea - is interrelated to the pending postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant’s ineffective
claims encompass numerous failings, including a failure to investigate, advise and
prepare a meaningful defense (R. pp. 162–165). The District Court’s duties, with
respect to the acceptance of a tendered guilty plea, are related to and dependent on
effective assistance of counsel. Therefore, because these post-conviction claims
remain pending, it is premature and unfair to consider the merits of this appeal. A
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fair consideration of the issues on appeal here is directly dependent on whether
trial counsel was effective; that issue is yet to be determined. Thus, the issues on
this appeal a very limited by the record here, which does not encompass the
broader claims. Nevertheless, as will be shown below, error was committed by the
District Court in accepting the guilty plea based solely on this record. By pursuing
this appeal, Appellant in no way waives any of the broader claims related to this
appeal now before the District Court in the post-conviction proceedings.
Also, Appellant requested the District Court to allow him to withdraw his
guilty plea and reconsider the sentence in light of the pending post-conviction
proceedings (R. pp. 137–138). The District Court denied this MOTION (R. pp.
148–151), concluding that Appellant had not presented any new argument,
authority or analysis to support the motion to withdraw his guilty plea (Id, p. 149).
Essentially, the District Court refused to recognize, or judicially notice, the
evidence submitted to date in the related post-conviction proceedings, particularly
the evidence supporting his assertions that he was not competent to enter a plea nor
was he advised of the elements of self-defense, let alone the elements of the charge
he faced (R. pp. 160-187). As of the filing of the MOTION, the claims and issues
had been extensively briefed with one claim of ineffective counsel still pending
and unresolved.
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C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
By COMPLAINT filed on February 4, 2016, Appellant was charged with the
crime of aggravated battery – the stabbing of the alleged victim with a knife (R. pp.
12, 13). The charge arose from a serious struggle between Appellant and the
alleged victim; Appellant’s mug shot reveals, superficially, the facial injuries
suffered by Appellant (PSI p. 26).
The facts of the case are highly disputed, as reflected in the PSI – the
OFFICIAL VERSION in contrast to the DEFENDANT’S VERSION.

The

OFFICIAL VERSION (PSI pp. 2–4) is based on what the alleged victims told the
investigating officers, and if true, is clearly disturbing as the general theme is that
Appellant “burst in and started stabbing him [victim Smith]” (Id, p. 3). There
were only three witnesses to the confrontation – victims Smith and Darner and the
Appellant (Id, p. 4). Darner was Appellant’s ex-girlfriend and Smith was here new
boyfriend. The DEFENDANT’S VERSION was remarkably different; essentially,
one of self-defense (Id, p. 6). There was no confession or admission by Appellant
when interviewed in the hospital3.

The Officer’s contention that Appellant

admitted being jealous was taken completely out of context. Also, the stab wounds
A recording and transcript of the officer’s interview of Appellant in the hospital shortly after
the confrontation is part of this record, including the alleged admission of jealousy (R. p. 228).
(From Appellant’s perspective, the entire interview was a biased effort to extract an admission of
guilt).
3
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to the victim Smith were the nine stab wounds to his back (PSI pp. 120, 605),
arguably supportive of a theory that Petitioner was acting in self-defense.
There was no preliminary hearing to test the veracity of the victims’ account
or challenge their credibility.

On March 15, 2016, Appellant waived the

preliminary hearing with his private counsel present, an associate of Ms. Hales (R.,
p. 38). A transcript of this short waiver hearing has been made part of this record
(R. p. 200). There are two significant events appearing at this point in the factual
history of the case. First, Appellant waived his right to a preliminary hearing
without the benefit of any plea bargain. Second, the State added an enhancement
count to the COMPLAINT (R. 34). It is upon these events that Appellant bases his
pending, remaining claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (see Footnote 1
above, p. 10). This remaining claim is supported by significant evidence including
the opinion of seasoned criminal defense attorney George Patterson (R. pp. 191–
194).
The focus of this appeal is the plea of guilty, Appellant appeared before the
District Court on August 10, 2016, to plead guilty. The District Court advised
Appellant that it must satisfy itself that there is a factual basis to accept a plea of
guilty (Tr. p. 9). Appellant obediently answered the District Court’s litany of
questions regarding the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea (Id, pp. 9–16).
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Then the District Court asked Appellant what happened in order to establish a
factual basis. The Appellant proceeded to inform the District Court that he was
present at the residence in issue, did not know the alleged victim Smith was
present, was taken by surprise and did not intend to harm anyone (Id, pp. 16–17.)
Appellant did not recall stabbing anyone because he was suffering from head
trauma (Id, 17). The District Court then gleaned that Appellant was suggesting
that he acted in self-defense, but did not advise Appellant of the elements of selfdefense (Id, p. 17). Appellant indicated that he still wanted to plead guilty because
“I believe I stabbed Mr. Smith, Your Honor, and it was an unlawful act” (Id, p.
18)4. The prosecutor proceeded to relate to the District Court what the alleged
victims told the investigating officers (Id, pp. 18, 19). The District Court then
accepted the Appellant’s plea, without asking him if he disputed what the
prosecutor had just represented - Appellant responded by stating that he believed
he was guilty. Again, there was no preliminary hearing to support a factual basis
for acceptance of the plea.
The District Court continued the case for sentencing and ordered a presentence report, which has been made part of this appellate record. As part of said
investigation, Appellant submitted, in writing, the DEFENDANT’S VERSION of
4

Appellant has asserted on the related post-conviction proceedings that, when he plead guilty, he was under the
impression that self-defense only applied in one’s own home (R. p. 196).
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the events, as referenced above (PSI pp. 6, 7).

Appellant maintained to the

investigator that he was grabbed by surprise and overpowered – he was claiming
self-defense in this submission, consistent with what he had told the District Court
at the plea hearing.
Appellant then appeared on October 5, 2016, for sentencing and exercised
his right to allocution (Tr. pp. 44–54). At the end of his lengthy presentation,
Appellant again explained that he acted in self-defense, that is, he intended no
harm, was taken by surprise and was over-powered (Id, pp. 51, 52). The District
Court interpreted Appellant’s representations as to his intent as a “gross attempt at
minimization” (Id, p. 56) and proceeded to impose a fifteen year sentence with
seven years determinate.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issues on appeal are as follows:
(1) Did the District Court abuse its discretion by accepting Appellant’s
guilty plea?
(2)

Did the District Court abuse its discretion by failing to consider

Appellant’s post-conviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea?
ARGUMENT
A. INTRODUCTION -
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As stated in the NATURE OF THE CASE above, Appellant’s claims of
lower court error arise from a breakdown of the criminal process. That breakdown
occurred by the District Court, itself, in accepting a tendered guilty plea under
circumstances which did not support a guilty plea. Unknown to the District Court
at the time the plea was accepted, was a second breakdown committed by defense
counsel.

These are interrelated in the sense that a fair determination of one

breakdown cannot be made without consideration of the second. The criminal
process is most dependent on competent counsel as a “backstop” to error, harmless
or otherwise, committed by the trial court. Not only was there was no “backstop”
here, trial counsel’s role contributed to the District Court error, as set out in the
post-conviction pleadings made part of this record (R. pp. 160- 248). The issues
relating to the ineffective claim are not before this Court on appeal and remain
unresolved. Nevertheless, the limited record on appeal here is sufficient to show
that it was error for the District Court to accept Appellant’s tendered plea of guilty.
The starting point for the determination of whether the District Court
committed error here is to understand the significance of a plea of guilty and the
attendant waiver of constitutional rights. In quoting U.S. Supreme Court case,
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), the Idaho
Supreme Court articulated that significance as follows:
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In Boykin the defendant had pleaded guilty to five counts of commonlaw robbery, a capital offense. So far as the record showed, the trial court
asked no questions of the defendant concerning his plea, and the defendant
did not address the court. In holding that the defendant had been denied due
process of law, the Supreme Court stated:
'Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place
[557 P.2d 628] when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First,
is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination * * *. Second, is the
right to trial by jury. Third, is the right to confront one's accusers. We cannot
presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record.
'What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands
the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the
matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of
what the plea connotes and of its consequence.
(State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34,
557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976) (emphasis added)
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW –
It is not uncommon for a trial court to accept a tendered guilty plea even
though the defendant asserts that he was, in fact, not guilty. As stated above,
Appellant asserted that he intended no harm, was taken by surprise but did stab the
victim because “I felt I was in great danger” (Tr. pp. 16–20). The District Court
suggested to Appellant that he was asserting self-defense but at no time did the
District Court inform Appellant of the elements of self-defense5. The standard of
review for the District Court’s acceptance or rejection of a guilty plea is one of

5

Appellant has claimed that his trial counsel never advised him of the elements of self-defense (R. p. 170).
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abuse of discretion (State v. Jones, 129 Idaho 471, 474, 926 P.2d 1318, 1321 (App.
1996)). Consequently:
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the
lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether
the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices
before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise
of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished
from arbitrary action. McFarland, 130 Idaho at 361, 941 P.2d at 333.
(State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535, 536
211 P.3d 775, 780, 781 (App. 2008)
C. IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO
ACCEPT THE PLEA OF GUILTY –
1. The District Court Failed to Advise Appellant of the Elements of the
Charge –
The facts of this case are unique. Appellant was charged and convicted of
Aggravated Battery (R. pp. 39, 40), the elements of which are: the willful and
unlawful use of force upon another (Idaho Code §§18-903(a), 907). The key word
is “unlawful”, for it is not a crime to willfully inflict force upon another in selfdefense. Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1517 (based on Idaho Code §19-201)
enumerates what must be proven to find that a defendant acted in self-defense:
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(1) the defendant must have believed that the defendant was in
imminent danger of bodily harm; (2) the defendant must have believed that
the action the defendant took was necessary to save the defendant from the
danger presented; (3) a reasonable person, under similar circumstances,
would have believed that the defendant was in imminent danger of bodily
injury and believed that the action taken was necessary; and (4) the
defendant must have acted only in response to that danger and not for some
other motivation.
Moreover, Idaho Code §18-201(3) excepts persons capable of committing crimes
as those “persons who committed the act … through misfortune or by accident,
when it appears that there was not evil design, intention or culpable negligence”.
Finally, Idaho Code §18- 114 requires the union of an act and intent to constitute a
crime.
As outlined above, Appellant, in so many words, expressed to the District
Court, three times, that he acted in self-defense: (1) at the plea hearing, (2) in the
PSI, DEFENDANT’S VERSION, and (3) at the sentencing hearing.
Appellant does not contest that the District Court failed to recognize that
acceptance of a guilty plea is discretionary. Appellant does, however, contest
whether the District Court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and whether
it exercised reason. The boundaries of discretion in this context are established by
I.C.R. 11(c) and Idaho case law. The Rule requires that the record of the entire
proceedings, including reasonable inferences therefrom, shows that the plea was
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voluntary and that the defendant was informed of the nature of the charge against
him. The reasonable inferences from this record do not reflect this necessary
showing. Appellant’s plea of guilt was not voluntary because he was not advised
on the elements of self-defense by either the District Court (or trial counsel).
The case law on this subject sheds considerable light on what constitutes a
voluntary plea. Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 647 P.2d 796 (App. 1982), is
highly pertinent and instructive on this appeal. Schmidt was a post-conviction
proceeding involving a conviction for delivery of controlled substances. Schmidt
claimed that the trial court failed to advise him of the elements of the crime and
failed to ascertain a factual basis to support the plea of guilty – these same
contentions are raised by Appellant here, but in an entirely different context.
Although the dismissal of Schmidt’s petition was affirmed, the Court of Appeals
addressed in detail the boundaries of discretion for the trial courts to consider when
a guilty plea is tendered.
Schmidt argued that his plea was not voluntary because neither the nature of
the crime nor the elements thereof were explained to him prior to the acceptance of
the plea. The Schmidt court, citing Henderson v. Morgan, 427 U.S. 367, 96 S. Ct.
2253, 49 L.Ed. 2d 108 (1976), emphasized that:
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When pleading guilty a defendant must be informed of the nature and
elements of the crime charged; otherwise his plea of guilty may be deemed
involuntary either because he did not understand the nature of the
constitutional protections which he waives by pleading guilty, or because he
had such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot
stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.
...
Henderson also held the guilty plea could not be voluntary in the sense that
it constituted an intelligent admission by the defendant to the offense, unless
he received real notice of the true nature of the charge against him. The
Court noted further that ordinarily the record of the proceedings contains
either an explanation of the charge by the trial judge or at least a
representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense has been
explained to the accused. The Court in Henderson concluded that because
the defendant did not receive adequate notice of the offense to which he pled
guilty, his plea was involuntary; and therefore its acceptance was
inconsistent with the defendant's rights of due process of law.
(Id, p. 343; emphasis added)
Schmidt also relied on State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 557 P.2d 626 (1976),
noting that “Our Supreme Court encouraged trial judges to engage defendants
seeking to plead guilty in as thorough and detailed a dialogue as time, resources
and circumstances permit, in order to forestall subsequent collateral attack on the
guilty plea” (Schmidt, 103 Idaho at p. 344). Finally, Schmidt cited State v.
Bradley, 98 Idaho 918, 575 P.2d 1306 (1978), and Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60,
625 P.2d 414 (1981), for the proposition that the elements of the crime charged,
particularly the intent element must be explained to the defendant. This duty to
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explain the elements of the charge is usually done through the reading of the
charging document and discussed in the presence of the defendant (Schmidt at p.
344). The record in all of these cases satisfied the requirement that the defendant
understood the nature of the charge.
This case is quite different. The District Court did read the charging
language (Tr. pp. 15, 16).

The District Court then raised the notion that

Appellant’s statements may constitute self-defense, but went no further in
explaining the elements of self-defense (Id, p. 17). It is apparent that Appellant
believed what he did was unlawful solely because he willfully stabbed the victim
(Id, p. 18), even though he did so in self-defense. Also, the District Court made no
inquiry of trial counsel as to whether self-defense had been discussed with
Appellant. Moreover, it was apparent to the District Court that Appellant, hard of
hearing, had questions about the Advisory Form the very day of sentencing (Tr. p.
7).

Those questions were delineated more specifically in Appellant’s notes

presented in the post-conviction proceedings (R., pp. 183, 184) – clearly he had
questions about the elements of the charge. The notes begin with the statement:
“plea hearing tomorrow” (Id, p. 183).
It is true that Aggravated Battery is a general intent crime, meaning that the
crime is complete when the perpetrator uses force upon another willfully and
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unlawfully. In the context of self-defense, general intent only begs the question:
was the willful conduct done in self-defense? If so, the willful conduct is not
unlawful. In order for the use of force on another to constitute a crime, it must be
done on purpose (State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509, 511), 129 P.3d 1258, 1260 (App.
2015), rather than by misfortune, accident or self-defense (Idaho Code §201(3)).
2. The District Court Failed to Establish a Factual Basis to Support the
Charge –
The failure to advise the Appellant of the elements of self-defense was
compounded by the failure to establish a factual basis for the charge. As stated
above, all trial courts in Idaho are encouraged “to engage defendants seeking to
plead guilty in as thorough and detailed a dialogue as time, resources and
circumstances permit in order to forestall subsequent collateral attack on the guilty
plea”. Had the District Court undertaken a further inquiry with Appellant as to the
factual basis of the charge, both the Court and Appellant would have realized that
the Appellant misunderstood the nature of the charge. Establishing a factual basis
to support the charge ensures against the very problem now before this Court –
whether the Appellant made a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty, which is
dependent on a full understanding of what conduct constitutes the crime charged.
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Returning to Schmidt, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that, as a general
rule, “there is no requirement of inquiry as to the factual basis for the plea”
(Schmidt, 103 Idaho at 345). Nevertheless, there are exceptions:
Several exceptions to this general rule have developed in cases where a
defendant seeks to have his plea accepted by the court, but (a) does not
recall the facts of the incident which resulted in the offense charged, or
(b) is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts
constituting the crime, or (c) couples his plea with continued assertion of
innocence. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27
L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); State v. Sparrow, supra; State v. Martinez, 89 Idaho
129, 403 P.2d 597 (1965). Here, Schmidt does not contend, nor show, that
he falls within any of these exceptions. We hold that, unless a case falls
within one of these exceptions, a court presented with a plea of guilty need
not inquire into the underlying factual basis before accepting the plea.
(Id, emphasis added)
All three exceptions apply in this case. First, Appellant did not recall the
facts of the incident (R. p. 17). Second, Appellant was unable to admit that his
participation in the event constituted a crime for the reason that he repeatedly
asserted (as outlined above) that he acted in self-defense. Third, Appellant coupled
his plea with assertions of innocence in the sense that self-defense is a defense to
the crime charged.
Additionally, the Schmidt case held that:
Of course, this holding does not diminish a court's obligation to conduct
such an inquiry if - after a plea is entered but before sentence is imposed the court receives information raising an obvious doubt as to whether the
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defendant is in fact guilty. In such circumstances, the trial court should
inquire into the factual basis of the plea, either to dispel the doubt or to allow
the defendant to plead anew.
(Id, at p. 345; emphasis added)
Appellant specifically advised the District Court, after the plea of guilty was
entered, that the confrontation began when he was grabbed and “Suddenly I was
struck by someone or something . . .” (PSI, p. 6). This is the type of information
which should have raised an obvious doubt as to whether Appellant was, in fact,
guilty, triggering the District Court’s duty to inquire further.
Also, the District Court never asked Appellant whether he agreed with the
State’s rendition of the facts (Tr. pp. 18, 19). It was obvious at this point that he
did not agree with this version of the facts. As mentioned above, the element of
intent, in the context of self-defense, was never explained to Appellant by the
District Court.
State v. Coffin, 104 Idaho 543, 661 P.2d 328, (1983), is instructive on this
point. The trial court accepted a plea to first degree burglary by Coffin who
entered a plea of guilty to the charge, which alleged a nighttime burglary. At
sentencing, Coffin advised the court that he committed the burglary in the daytime,
raising a defense to first degree burglary (Id, at 546) and the following occurred:
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The defendant's allegations that he entered the cabins during the daytime
and, inferentially, that he was innocent of first degree burglary, came to the
court's attention at the sentencing hearing held on September 8, 1980. The
district court registered its concern that defendant pleaded guilty to first
degree burglary when he claimed to have entered the cabins in the daytime.
The court inquired as to whether the defendant had pleaded voluntarily and
whether he was aware of the differences in sentences that could be imposed
upon first and second degree burglary convictions. Defendant affirmatively
answered both inquiries. The court then advised the defendant to think
carefully about his pleas and to discuss the matter with his attorney,
and further advised the defendant that the court would allow him the
opportunity to withdraw his pleas of guilty to first degree burglary. The
district court then recessed.
The court reconvened at approximately 3:00 p.m., on September 9,
1980. At that time the court asked the defendant whether he wanted to
continue with or withdraw his guilty pleas. The defendant stated that he
had thought about his pleas, had had time to discuss them with his
attorney, and that he wished to continue with his pleas of guilty. Only
after the defendant reaffirmed his desire to plead guilty to the charges of first
degree burglary did the trial court enter its judgments of conviction and
impose sentences thereon.
(Id, at p. 547, emphasis added)
None of the procedure utilized by the trial court in Coffin was utilized here.
This procedure ensured that the Coffin made a reasoned and intelligent decision to
proceed with his plea even though he initially denied an element of the offense. In
contrast, Appellant was left adrift and confused as to the very nature of what he
was pleading guilty to.
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The Coffin Court also cited to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91
S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). Alford, as well as, State v. Hoffman, 108
Idaho 720, 701 P.2d 668 (App. 1985), stand for the proposition that if a
defendant expresses a desire to enter a guilty plea, even though asserting
innocence, the trial Court may accept the plea anyway, unless the court receives
information before sentencing that raises a doubt as to the defendant’s guilty this is in accord with Schmidt discussed above. Moreover, a valid Alford plea
is premised on competent defense counsel, which is seriously contested in the
related, pending post-conviction proceedings (R. pp. 162–165).
In summary, the record here shows that the District Court abused its
discretion by failing to act within the boundaries of its discretion, as determined
by the above legal standards, and by failing to exercise reason when confronted
with the assertions by Appellant that his conduct in issue was, in fact, selfdefense. The District Court did not advise Appellant of the elements of selfdefense nor establish a factual basis, acknowledged by Appellant, that supported
the plea. It is surprising how little concern the District Court showed toward the
obvious incongruity it faced – Appellant expressed a desire to plead guilty, but
asserted innocence.

The District Court could have begun an appropriate

exercise of discretion by simply asking Appellant why he wanted to plead
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guilty. The Appellant would have answered this question in similar fashion to
his declarations already on the record, that is, he believed (mistakenly) that he
was guilty (Tr. p. 17). Then the Court could have advised Appellant that
willfully stabbing someone does not necessarily make you guilty because
defending oneself is not a crime. At this point, Appellant could then have made
an intelligent plea. Instead, like “pouring salt into the wounds”, the District
Court used Appellant’s incongruous statements against him at sentencing by
characterizing the assertions of innocence as a “gross attempt at minimization”
(Tr. p. 56).
3. The District Court Abused its Discretion with Respect to Appellant’s
Post-Judgement Motions –
The District Court re-entered a JUDGMENT & COMMITMENT on June 7,
2018 (R. p. 144) as a result of the post-conviction proceedings.

The State

conceded that trial counsel failed to file a notice of appeal6. Subsequent to the reentered Judgment, and prior to appeal, Appellant filed a MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AND RECONSIDERATION OF SENTENCE
(“MOTION”) (R., pp. 17 – 139). The basis for this MOTION was the postconviction proceedings then pending. Appellant requested that District Court to

6

See footnote 1 above.
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take judicial notice of the entire post-conviction file, specifically the eight items
outlined in the MOTION (R. pp. 166–169). Judicial notice is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion (Rome v. State, Dkt #45140, 11/29/2018).
The MOTION was based on the pleadings, including extensive arguments
and memorandum filed, to date, in the post-conviction proceedings (R. p. 138).
The post-conviction proceeding raised significant constitutional due process and
ineffective counsel claims R. pp. 160 – 166).

The due process claims were

directed squarely at the District Court’s failings in accepting Appellant’s guilty
plea. If relief were to be granted on one or more of these claims, Appellant’s
MOTION would have been moot, as “manifest injustice” would have been
established.
Instead of considering the Rule 33(c) MOTION and its merits, based on the
post-conviction proceedings, the District Court denied the same because
“Defendant’s filings in CV01-17-19830 do not present any argument, authority, or
analysis of ‘manifest injustice’, as required by the Court to find pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 33(c)” (R. p. 149). Likewise, the District Court denied the Rule
35(b) MOTION because “Defendant has not presented the Court with any new
evidence to consider” (R. p. 150).
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Essentially, the District Court refused to judicially notice the pleadings
requested, or consider the merits of Appellant’s MOTION, even though the postconviction proceedings were pending and the District Court, two and one-half
months earlier, had granted partial relief – the re-entered JUDGMENT. .
With respect to judicial notice, surely the specificity required by I.R.E.
201(c) was provided - these were all documents which were, in fact, filed in the
post-conviction proceedings. It was an abuse of discretion to refuse to judicially
notice these materials. Clearly, Appellant was attempting to incorporate the record
from the post-conviction proceedings into the criminal case as a basis to vacate the
guilty plea which was the objective of the post-conviction proceedings. These
proceedings incorporated new facts and arguments that were outside of the
criminal proceedings.
The District Court’s position on the MOTION in issue is revealing more of
an attitude of almost contempt for fair-minded judicial oversight.

In similar

fashion to the failure to meaningfully address the apparent incongruity between
Appellant’s expressed desire to plead guilty and his assertions of innocence, the
District Court summarily dismisses Appellant’s post-JUDGMENT effort to rectify
a wrong without any effort to reconsider its own role in the plea process let alone
trial counsel’s role. This is arbitrary and an abuse of discretion
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CONCLUSION
Needless to say, the authority of the State over its citizens is immense – it
includes the power to imprison and, consequently, forfeit large portions of a free
life. Prior to doing so, however, there exists a process designed to ensure that the
State’s authority is not implemented in an arbitrary or abusive manner.

The

integrity of that process is stationed upon two linchpins: (1) judicial supervision –
the focus of this appeal and (2) trial counsel competency – the focus of the related,
pending post-conviction proceedings.
In this case, the District Court was confronted with an anomaly, or
incongruity:

the Appellant expressed a desire to plead guilty in the face of

assertions of innocence – self-defense – a defense corroborated by various aspects
of the facts of the case. When this happens, the utmost solicitude is required to
ensure that the plea is truly voluntary in the sense that the defendant knows, and
understands, the elements of the crime charged, as well as the elements of any
defense thereto. A simple belief that one is guilty should never be enough for the
reason that the defendant might be mistaken. The solicitude here fell short of what
we must expect, as a society, from the District Court’s supervisory role,
particularly when the State seeks lengthy imprisonment. Thus, the plea of guilty
should be vacated and the process started anew.
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Respectfully submitted this 16th day of January, 2019.

BY: /s/ John C. Lynn
JOHN C. LYNN
Attorney for the Appellant
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